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I. INTRODUCTION – MAKING A PLACE FOR 
APOLOGY IN THE LEGAL LEXICON 
 
 “Say you’re sorry!”  Thinking of this command may 
conjure up the image of an elementary school teacher 
admonishing a student for teasing a classmate, or perhaps a 
grandmother mediating a broken toy dispute between her two 
grandsons.  Sadly, one is less likely to think of a lawyer 
giving this advice to a client.  While television programs such 
as Law and Order and Boston Legal beam enough images of 
bickering attorneys to make any viewer think that lawyers are 
an uncompromising lot, the very real practices of stalling and 
procedural stonewalling used by lawyers clog the judicial 
arteries with gridlock and delay resolution of legal disputes.  
Professor Jonathan Cohen has even argued that the legal 
system has made the “immoral the normal” by encouraging 
denial over responsibility.1  Apologies have the power to 
mend the bruised psyche and yet they are avoided by lawyers 
and clients, and in several instances, discouraged by the law.2 
 This article examines both the potential benefits and 
detriments of the use of an apology in a legal setting.  This 
article uses the specific environment surrounding a medical 
malpractice case to help illustrate how and why an apology 
should or should not be proffered by the Defendant.  
Ultimately, the reader of this article should have a solid 
                                                 
* Attorney Pillsbury is a 2006 graduate and valedictorian of the Southern 
New England School of Law. 
1  Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 903, 
904 (2005). 
2  Id. 




understanding of how an apology can be admissible as 
evidence in the litigation of a medical malpractice lawsuit. 
The introduction of apologies as a commonly used legal 
tool has the power to revolutionize medical malpractice law.  
Research indicates that an apology given by a doctor to a 
patient harmed by medical error has beneficial effects for 
both parties. 3  Yet, there is a tendency among defendants to 
withhold apologies out of the fear that such statements will be 
used against them as evidence at trial.4  As legal scholars 
Peter H. Rehm and Denise R. Beatty state, “Since an apology 
usually can be admitted into evidence, and because some 
plaintiffs choose to understand an apology as an admission of 
guilt, it seems safest not to apologize.”5  Applying Rehm and 
Beatty’s words to the field of medical malpractice law, it can 
be seen that before doctors and other health care 
professionals can embrace apologies on a wide scale, two 
obstacles must be overcome.  First, doctors must learn when 
the law allows them to apologize without the fear of an 
apology returning in the form of evidence against the doctor 
at trial.  Second, lawmakers must be encouraged to knock 
down legal barriers that prevent doctors from apologizing to 
patients. 
 Doctors, hospitals, and other medical professionals may 
wonder why they should apologize to patients in the wake of 
a harmful medical error.  “Because it is the right thing to do” 
is the straightforward answer that may come to mind for 
subscribers of Cohen’s claims that denial is immoral and 
acceptance of responsibility is moral.6  A moral argument can 
indeed be made that those who have wronged others should 
take responsibility for their actions and accept the 
consequences.7  The apology scholar, Aaron Lazare, has 
                                                 
3  The Sorry Works! Coalition, What is the Sorry Works Coalition? 
http://www.sorryworks.net/WhatIs.phtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
4  Peter H. Rehm and Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of 
Apologizing, 1996 J. Disp. Resol. 115, 118 (1996). 
5  Id. 
6 Cohen, supra note 1, at 904. 
7  Id. 
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argued that a doctor’s apology is a crucial component in a 
patient’s recovery from harm caused by medical error.8  
While an apology may never help a harmed patient or his or 
her family recover faith in the medical system, the receipt of 
an expression of sorrow can help repair the emotional 
damage suffered by a patient who trusted a doctor with his 
health, or family members who trusted a doctor with the life 
of a loved one, only to be gravely disappointed.9  As Lazare 
explains: “[P]atients are often ashamed of their illness and 
sometimes humiliated by their physicians.  Apologies, I have 
learned, are perhaps the only way to heal, or at least to 
minimize, the harm of humiliations.”10 
 “Minimizing the harm of humiliations” is indeed a noble 
reason for a doctor to give an apology.  There is of course the 
valid argument that an apology does not repair the physical 
damage caused by medical error.  Indeed, it would be absurd 
to suggest that patients should be forgiving to the point that 
they forego all compensation for their injuries caused by 
malpractice as long as an apology is received.  However, 
keeping with Lazare’s line of reasoning, doctors must realize 
that while they cannot repair the physical damage of their 
mistakes, they can, through an apology, ease the emotional 
damage experienced by patients who have been harmed by a 
doctor’s mistake.11  People already suffer from feelings of 
indignity when they experience health problems that force 
them to become patients.12  Trusting in a doctor’s care, only 
to later learn that this trust worsened the patient’s injury, 
leads to humiliation that only an apology can alleviate.13 
Cohen has argued that there is a psychological benefit to 
the apologizer in that he will not suffer the inner turmoil 
caused by not taking responsibility for harm he has caused to 
another person.14  “Getting away with it,” Cohen states, can 
                                                 
8  AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 20 (2004). 
9  Id. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Cohen, supra note 1, at 932. 




have more severe personal ramifications for a wrongdoer 
than being held accountable by an “external authority.”15 
Since, as Rehm and Beatty have suggested, an apology yields 
psychological benefits to both the apologizer and the apology 
recipient, and it is unfortunate that fear of legal reprisal often 
keeps sorrow from being expressed.16 
 The numbers themselves provide another argument for a 
greater need for apologies within medical malpractice law.17 
The Greek physician Hippocrates once said, “Whenever a 
doctor cannot do good, he must be kept from doing harm.”18  
Even in an era long past, the founder of modern medicine 
realized that while doctors have the power to heal, they also 
have the ability to worsen a patient’s condition.  Doctors, 
according to the Hippocratic view, must be allowed to do 
what they can to help, and refrain from activity that causes a 
patient further harm.  In modern times, it appears that 
Hippocrates’ words have gone unheeded.  A report by the 
Institute of Medicine estimates that as many as 98,000 people 
die in U.S. hospitals each year as the result of medical 
errors.19 Stated differently, nearly 100,000 people a year die 
from a mistake committed by a medical worker they trusted 
their lives to.  This staggering figure alone supports the 
position that there is a moral argument that doctors should 
apologize for their mistakes, and the removal of these legal 
barriers to apologies is essential.  With patients dying at such 
a rapid rate due to medical error, the medical profession as a 
whole has a duty to take responsibility, explain how 
individual errors were made, and determine how such errors 
can be avoided in the future. 
                                                 
15  Id. 
16  Rehm & Beatty, supra note 4. 
17  Familydoctor.org, Medical Errors: Tips to Help Prevent Them, 
http://familydoctor.org/736.xml    
(last visited Oct 18, 2006). 
18  Thinkexist.com, Hippocrates Quotes, 
http://en.thinkexist.com/quotes/hippocrates/2.html (last visited Oct 30, 
2006). 
19  Rehm & Beatty, supra note 4. 
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 An apology may be the right thing to do, but the 
unfortunate, yet realistic, truth is that members of the medical 
profession, being part of a multi-million dollar industry, do 
not have an incentive to embrace apologies until they can be 
convinced that apologizing is the financially beneficial thing 
to do.20 Promoting the morality behind acceptance of 
responsibility is a lofty goal.  On the other hand, individual 
doctors or hospitals facing potential costly verdicts may 
understandably decide that fiscal solvency outranks morality. 
Accordingly, before apologies can ever become an accepted 
part of the medical malpractice lawyer’s legal toolbox, the 
following two assertions must be examined thoroughly: 1. in 
situations where the law does not treat an apology as 
admissible evidence, an apology is in the doctor’s and 
patient’s best financial interest; 2. as for situations where the 
law does treat an apology as admissible evidence, lawmakers 
have an opportunity to make changes that will financially 
benefit both doctors and patients.  
 
II. THE FIRST ASSERTION: INADMISSIBLE 
APOLOGIES 
 
 Utilizing a review of how the law of evidence applies to 
apologies, doctors will gain a better understanding of when 
they can freely apologize without the fear of legal liability.  
In contrast, they will also learn that in certain situations, an 
apology is unprotected by the law and it could return in the 
form of evidence against them.  Since research indicates that 
there is a correlation between apologies and better settlements 
for the apologizer, it is in the best interest of parties faced 
with a medical malpractice lawsuit to learn to recognize when 





                                                 
20  Sorry Works!, supra note 3. 
21  Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An 
Empirical Examination, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 460, 482 (2003). 




A. HOW APOLOGIES ARE AFFECTED BY THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide rules that apply to 
a variety of different statements, including apologies.22  The 
“hearsay” rules, Fed. R. Evid. 800, and two rules that limit 
the admissibility of relevant evidence, Fed R. Evid 408 and 
Fed. R. Evid. 409, are of particular interest to the issue of 
when apologies are admissible against defendant doctors in 
medical malpractice actions. 
 
i. HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
 
 The Federal definition of the term hearsay is “a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.”23  In less complex terms, as a general rule, 
whatever is said outside of the courtroom cannot be offered 
as testimonial evidence inside the courtroom.24  Without 
delving further into the issue, one might therefore assume that 
a doctor is free to apologize “ad nauseum” to his patient 
without fear of legal reprisal, as long as he apologizes 
anywhere but inside the courtroom.  However, due to the 
many exceptions to the hearsay rule that allow otherwise 
inadmissible out of court statements to be admitted into 
evidence, this assumption is an incorrect one. 
One exception to the hearsay rule allows admissions by 
party opponents to be admitted into evidence against the 
opposing party.25  This rule includes statements by an 
opponent, as well as the agents or other representatives of an 
                                                 
22  While the evidentiary rules of most states closely resemble the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, there are often deviations among the states.  
Medical malpractice lawyers and doctors can turn to the Federal Rules for 
guidance, but are advised to research how the evidentiary rules of their 
practice states affect them.  In state law based suits, state evidentiary law 
obviously trumps the Federal Rules. 
23  FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
24  Id. 
25  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
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opponent.26  When applied to a medical malpractice case, this 
exception to the rule renders a doctor’s out of court apology 
admissible against the doctor, and potentially the health care 
organization the doctor is employed by.  By apologizing, the 
doctor has admitted to wrongdoing, and the apology cannot 
be kept out of court using the hearsay rule.27 
 
ii. LIMITS TO RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
 
Only relevant evidence may be admitted at trial.28  
Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that tends to make a 
“fact of consequence to the determination of the action” more 
or less likely than it would be without the evidence.29  If a 
piece of evidence makes it likely that a crucial point in the 
case occurred or did not occur, then the evidence is relevant 
and admissible.30  In many respects, this rule provides 
efficiency to the trial process.  Perhaps a plaintiff wishes to 
introduce evidence in a medical malpractice case that the 
defendant doctor has a bad temper and routinely shouts 
obscenities at the hospital staff.  Although, this evidence 
would most likely bring the defendant into disfavor with the 
jury, it does not make it more likely than not that the doctor 
committed a medical error upon treatment of the patient.  
Unless the plaintiff can show that the doctor’s temper led to 
the medical error, a court will not admit this evidence.  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence embrace the notion that trials are 
to be won on the merits of the case and are not to descend 
into a popularity contest.31 
What is the potential result if a doctor makes an attempt 
to settle a malpractice case?  From a quick glance at the rules 
of evidence, one might assume that if a doctor apologizes 
while attempting to settle a case, such statements would be 
                                                 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
29  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 




relevant and admissible against the doctor.32  Thus, the 
plaintiff could argue that a doctor would not offer to settle or 
apologize if he had not committed any medical error, and 
accordingly, the doctor’s apology should be admitted as 
evidence of medical error.33 However, to prevent the clogging 
of judicial arteries with cases that could be disposed of 
through settlement, there is an exception to the relevant 
evidence rule with regard to settlement negotiations.34  When 
dealing with a legal dispute that has already arisen, evidence 
of “compromise or offers to compromise,” which includes 
evidence of an offer to settle a case, is inadmissible.35  This 
inadmissibility shield extends not only to the settlement offer, 
but to any statements made by the parties during the 
settlement negotiations.36 
With respect to a medical malpractice dispute, the key 
problem with the “compromise” exception is that a doctor’s 
apology is only protected once a legal dispute arises.37  
Effectively, the doctor who wishes to apologize for an error 
must wait, in order to avoid the admission of his apology as 
evidence, until the patient threatens to sue him.38  The doctor 
who recognizes his mistake early on and takes the initiative 
of offering a settlement before the patient threatens legal 
action is punished in that his statements, including apologies, 
will be admissible evidence.39 
 Turning once more to Fed. R. Evid. 401, there is another 
exception to the hearsay rule in the area of offers to pay 
medical expenses.40  It could be argued that a doctor’s offer 
to pay a patient’s medical expenses should be admissible 
under the theory that a doctor would not pay for expenses that 
he did not cause, thus making it more likely than not that he 
                                                 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  FED. R. EVID. 408. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  FED. R. EVID. 409 
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or she caused the additional expenses.41  This argument, 
however, would fail under Fed. R. Evid. 409, which protects 
the action of a defendant paying or offering to pay for 
medical expenses from admissibility.42  This rule specifically 
states: “[E]vidence of furnishing or offering or promising to 
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an 
injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.” 43 
 When this rule is broken down, it can be seen that a 
doctor who offers to pay the medical bills of a patient who 
has been harmed by his or her conduct does not have to fear 
that evidence of this offer will be admitted against them.  
Unlike the compromise exception of Fed. R. Evid. 408, a 
doctor may freely offer, without fear, to pay for medical 
expenses even before a legal dispute arises.44 However, Fed. 
R. Evid. 409 lacks the protection that Fed. R. Evid. 401 gives 
to certain additional statements.45 Doctors must be advised 
that while they may freely pay for medical expenses before a 
legal dispute arises, an apology under these circumstances 
can be admissible in court.46  To illustrate, imagine a doctor 
stating, “I would like to pay for your medical bills.  I’m sorry 
I made an improper incision during your operation.”  Under 
Fed. R. Evid. 409, the first statement would be inadmissible, 
but the second statement, made before a legal dispute and 
outside of settlement negotiations, is not protected and is 
admissible.47 
 
iii. APOLOGIES INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF 
SETTLEMENT ACCEPTANCE 
 
 During settlement negotiations, doctors may feel free to 
apologize for anything and everything they feel responsible 
                                                 
41  See supra note 29. 
42  See supra note 40. 
43  Id. 
44  See supra note 34. 
45  Id. 
46  Id.  
47  Id. 




for and not worry about the attachment of evidentiary value.48 
Yet, a reasonable question to be asked is, “Why take the 
chance?”  As Rehm and Beatty have argued, defendants fear 
apologizing and plaintiffs often attempt to turn an apology 
against the apologizer.49  A doctor, hospital administrator, or 
other medical professional may simply decide the safest 
option is to offer a sum of money to make the case disappear, 
but refuse to apologize in fear of making the situation 
worse.50 
 According to the research of legal scholar Jennifer K. 
Robbenolt, taking the “no apology” approach during 
settlement negotiations is unwise.51  Robbenolt discusses the 
results of a study in which participants were asked to 
essentially “step into the shoes” of a person injured in a 
pedestrian-bicycle accident.52  The study called for the 
participants to log on to a website, read a scenario, and then 
answer questions.53  Among the participants, the scenarios 
varied with different information given regarding the 
opponent’s apology, or lack thereof.54  The results created an 
intriguing window into how apologies can impact the 
acceptance of proposed settlement offers.55  As Robbenolt 
reported:  
 
When no apology was offered 52% of 
respondents indicated that they would 
definitely or probably accept the offer, while 
43% would definitely or probably reject the 
offer and 5% were unsure. When a partial 
apology was offered, only 35% of respondents 
were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were 
                                                 
48  Id.. 
49  Rehm & Beatty, supra note 4. 
50  Id. 
51  See supra note 21. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
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inclined to reject it, and 40% indicated that 
they were unsure. In contrast, when a full 
apology was offered, 73% of respondents were 
inclined to accept the offer, with only 13-14% 
each inclined to reject it or remaining unsure.56 
 
 This study indicates that there is a correlation between 
apologies and willingness to settle.57  While only half of the 
participants were willing to accept the proposed settlement 
offer without an apology, three-fourths of the participants 
accepted the offer when a full apology was given. 58  
Interestingly, while the study shows that a full apology 
carries the best chance of a settlement acceptance, one is 
actually better off not to apologize at all rather than give a 
partial apology.59  Only thirty-five percent of those surveyed 
were willing to accept a settlement when faced with an 
expression of sorrow that did not encompass the entire 
situation. 60  Moreover, this study indicates that no apology, 
or worse yet, a partial apology, or one that appears less than 
fully sincere, leads to a decreased likelihood of settlement. 61  
Increased feelings of sympathy and decreased feelings of 
anger were generated by a full apology.   As Robbenolt 
stated: 
 
While an offender offering a full apology was 
seen as believing that he or she was more 
responsible for the incident than one who 
offered a partial or no apology, the conduct of 
the full apologizer was judged more favorably 
than that of offenders who offered either a 
partial or no apology.62 
 
                                                 
56  Id. at 485-86. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 487-88. 




 Robbenolt’s research generates a clear rule for parties to 
consider in their settlement negotiations.  A full apology 
increases the chances that a settlement will be accepted while 
no apology or a partial apology decreases the chances of a 
settlement. 63  Overall, these results demonstrate the ability of 
a full apology to elicit a compassionate feeling of forgiveness 
in the plaintiff leading to an increased likelihood to accept a 
settlement offer.64  Conversely, they also demonstrate how 
anger over a failure to accept responsibility can reduce the 
possibility of settlement.65 
 These results are open to criticism in that mere 
participants reading a scenario on a computer screen will 
react differently than someone with an actual injury.  
Someone with only a hypothetical injury may be more 
willing to forgive than a party with a real injury.  However, 
despite this criticism, the study shows that there is, at least, a 
stronger likelihood of settlement acceptance when a full 
apology is rendered.66  In other words, one who apologizes 
during settlement negotiations has nothing to lose and 
everything to gain.  The best possible result is that the 
plaintiff, feeling compassion as a result of the apology, may 
be willing to settle the case for an amount much lower than 
the cost of a trial and subsequent finding of liability against 
the defendant. 67 In the case of a less forgiving plaintiff, Fed. 
R. Evid. 408 prevents statements made during settlement 
negotiations from being admissible at trial, meaning the 
apologizing party need not fear the possibility that the 
apology will be used as evidence against him.  Indeed, a party 
who feels he has not made an error may reject on principle 
the concept of apologizing for the sake of settlement.  
However, based on Robbenolt’s research, one who feels 
comfortable giving an apology should be strongly encouraged 
by his attorney to do so within the context of settlement 
                                                 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
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negotiations.68 Apologizing during settlement negotiations is 
a “win-win” situation. In doing so, the defendant stands a 
better chance of having his settlement offer accepted, but will 
still be protected against the opponent who refuses to settle 
and wishes to use the apology as evidence at trial.69  
 
iv. SELF-HELP: THE SORRY WORKS METHOD 
 
 Robbenolt’s research supports the concept that it is in 
one’s best financial interest to apologize for wrongdoing 
during settlement negotiations.70  The Sorry Works Coalition 
has taken this concept a step further with the proposition that 
hospitals should adopt a policy of full disclosure when 
dealing with medical errors.71  As intriguing as an argument 
based on the likelihood of better settlements may be, the 
research of this lobbying organization reveals actual evidence 
of financial savings stemming from a policy that embraces 
the expression of remorse.72 
 Under the Sorry Works approach, hospitals are to conduct 
an internal review of all medical errors.73  If hospital 
representatives determine that a medical error stemmed from 
a failure to adhere to the requisite standard of care, then the 
hospital is to contact the patient, seek settlement, apologize 
for the mistake, and answer the patient’s questions openly.74  
If the hospital has not engaged in activity that fell below the 
standard of care, hospital representatives are still required 
communicate with the patient and be forthcoming with 
                                                 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  The Sorry Works! Coalition is a lobbying organization comprised of 
doctors, medical malpractice lawyers, and other interested parties who 
have come together for the purpose of bringing apologies to the forefront 
of medical malpractice law.  Their website is located at 
www.sorryworks.net and provides a wealth of articles, reports, statistics, 
and other information regarding the topic of apologies in medical  
malpractice law. 
72  Sorry Works!, supra note 3. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 




information requests from patients wishing to know more 
about how they were harmed.75  A critic might wonder why a 
hospital representative would communicate with a patient at 
all if the hospital has not done anything wrong.  The Sorry 
Works Coalition explains that in such cases being honest with 
patients relieves them of the suspicion that a cover-up has 
taken place, reducing the likelihood of a lawsuit filed in an 
attempt to learn more about the medical error through 
discovery.76 
 Two hospitals have adopted this full disclosure approach 
and experienced great savings in legal fees according to the 
coalition.77  During the 1980s, the Veteran’s Administration 
Hospital in Lexington, KY was the first to adopt the approach 
that would later become the cornerstone of the Sorry Works 
movement.78  After initiating the program, the hospital saw 
significant results when it came to settlements.79  Within a 
seven year period after initiating the program, the Lexington 
Veterans Hospital’s average payment per settlement dropped 
to $16,000, compared to the average of a $98,000 payout per 
settlement for other VA hospitals nationwide at the time.80   
In another situation, after adopting the full-disclosure 
approach, the University of Michigan hospital system 
reported a significant reduction in legal costs as well.81  The 
number of pending lawsuits against the Michigan hospital 
system was cut by half.82  In addition, the defense litigation 
costs dropped from an average of $65,000 per case to 
$35,000 per case, which the hospital maintains has led to a 
total savings of $2 million a year.83 
                                                 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Sorry Works! Excited Actuaries at the University of Michigan 
Hospital System,  
http://www.sorryworks.net/media22.phtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2006). 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
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The figures reported by these hospitals demonstrate that 
by embracing apology as a remedy, hospitals benefit from 
reduced legal costs.  These examples lead use to imagine the 
cost savings that could be realized if apologies were 
embraced and encouraged in medical malpractice law on a 
nationwide scale.  Sorry Works attributes these savings to a 
multitude of factors benefiting both the defendant and the 
plaintiff.84  Plaintiffs benefit in reduced legal fees as they do 
not have to expend large sums of money in the search of how 
their medical care went awry.85  Instead, the doctor or 
hospital, the parties with the most information of what went 
wrong, supplies it.86  In turn, hospitals save legal costs by 
avoiding protracted legal battles over information the patient 
is likely to gain anyway during the discovery process.87  A 
common practice in medical malpractice law is to name 
several doctors as defendants who turn out later to be 
vindicated simply because the plaintiff was unable to 
determine at the time of filing which specific doctor caused 
the harm.88  Therefore, a full disclosure approach protects 
doctors who have committed no error from being named as 
defendants.89  Ultimately, medical professionals, by 
apologizing up front and taking responsibility, are able to 
benefit by convincing a patient that responsibility has been 
accepted, no “cover up” is being engaged in, and a reasonable 
settlement to compensate the patient’s injuries can be reached 
without moving forward to trial.90 
                                                 
84  Robbenolt, supra note 21. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Medical professionals, in reviewing the Sorry Works! full 
disclosure policy, should still keep in mind FED. R. EVID. 408.  While 
Sorry Works! advocates a full disclosure approach, the safest move is to 
wait until the patient has threatened legal action, thus giving rise to a legal 
dispute.  Offers to settle and corresponding statements of apology are only 
protected from admissibility if they are made after the  
initiation of a legal dispute under FED. R. EVID. 408. 




 Plaintiffs and patients are not the only ones to benefit 
from an apology policy.  Medical malpractice trial lawyers 
benefit as well.91  Sorry Works reports that when working on 
medical malpractice cases on a contingency basis, lawyers 
often front between $50,000 and $500,000 with only a thirty-
three percent chance of a successful outcome.92  Seventy-
seven percent of lawyers expend large sums of money and 
effort without a financial reward in the end.93  A full 
disclosure policy of apology results in a ninety-five percent 
success rate, with cases being resolved between two and six 
months.94  Lawyers do not have to suffer through years of 
having cash tied up in cases that may never result in a 
profit.95 
 
III. THE SECOND ASSERTION: CHANGING THE 
LAW IN SITUATIONS WHERE APOLOGIES ARE 
ADMISSIBLE 
 
 When a medical professional apologizes outside the 
context of settlement negotiations, his apology is fair game 
and can be used as evidence against him at trial.96  As the 
research of Sorry Works has shown, significant savings in 
legal fees result from a policy that embraces apology.97  In 
light of these findings, judges and legislators have an 
opportunity to change the law in ways that encourage 
apologies even before a plaintiff raises the lawsuit specter.  
Judges must be encouraged to follow the example of the 
Vermont Supreme Court in preventing a doctor’s apology to 
be used as the sole evidence of a deviation from the standard 
                                                 
91  The Sorry Works! Coalition, Just the Facts 
http://www.sorryworks.net/article6.phtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2006). 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  FED. R. EVID. 408. 
97  See supra note 72.  
2006 Say Sorry and Save  187 
 
 
of care.98  Lawmakers interested in changing the evidentiary 
laws of their individual states can obtain guidance by 
analyzing what other states have accomplished in this area. 
 
A. CASE LAW ANALYSIS: PREVENTING A DOCTOR’S 
APOLOGY FROM BEING THE SOLE EVIDENCE OF 
DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE 
 
i. DEFINING THE STANDARD OF CARE 
 
 A successful medical malpractice action usually requires 
the existence of three factors: “(1) a duty of care on the part 
of the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a violation of that duty 
through a failure to conform to the requisite standard; and (3) 
causation of the injury resulting from that failure.”99  Medical 
malpractice actions are negligence based claims and 
accordingly establish what level of care a doctor is to 
provide, and whether there was a deviation from that level of 
care.100  These are crucial points that, if left unproven, could 
lead to a loss for the plaintiff. 
The individual states have the power to set forth what 
standard a doctor practicing within the state will be held to.101  
For example, in Palandjian v. Foster, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts explained the standard of care that 
doctors in Massachusetts are to follow.102  In doing so, the 
court distinguished between what is required of general 
practitioners versus what is expected of doctors who 
specialize in a particular field of medicine: 
 
“The proper standard is whether the physician, 
if a general practitioner, has exercised the 
degree of care and skill of the average 
qualified practitioner, taking into account the 
                                                 
98  Senesac v. Assoc. in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900, 903 
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advances in the profession . . . .  [A] specialist 
should be held to the standard of care and skill 
of the average member of the profession 
practising [practicing] the specialty, taking 
into account the advances in the profession.”  
Because the standard of care is based on the 
care that the average qualified physician 
would provide in similar circumstances, the 
actions that a particular physician, no matter 
how skilled, would have taken are not 
determinative.103 
 
 Here, the Supreme Judicial Court set forth an objective 
standard of care for doctors to follow.104  This language 
recognizes the fact that while medicine is not an exact 
science, there is a certain level of competency that all doctors 
must display in their work.105  Indeed, there are doctors who 
strive beyond what is considered “average” in their 
profession.106  However, under the Supreme Judicial Court’s 
opinion, the fact that a more diligent than usual doctor would 
take notice of a possible error and prevent its occurrence is of 
no consequence.107  While doctors with exceptionally high 
skills are to be applauded, the appropriate inquiry is how the 
average doctor practicing in that particular field of medicine 
would have reacted under the same set of circumstances.108  
A doctor will be held liable only if he fails to meet the 
standard applied to all doctors in the given field, but will not 
be held liable for failing to achieve above average results in 
his practice.109 
 
                                                 
103  Id. (quoting Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 
1968)). 
104  Id. at 920–21. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 920–21. 
109  Id. 
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ii. SENESAC AS A BREAKTHROUGH IN MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE LAW 
 
 In states that promote this objective standard, there is a 
danger that courts will be persuaded to allow a doctor’s 
apology for an alleged mistake to be admitted as evidence of 
the doctor’s deviation from the requisite standard of care.110  
However, the Supreme Court of Vermont became a pioneer 
in the realm of medical malpractice law by rejecting the 
admission of a doctor’s apology as the main evidence of the 
doctor’s deviation from the standard of care.111   
The facts of the Senesac case reveal a story of a 
physician’s error and her subsequent apology.112  In 1973, the 
plaintiff, Mary Senesac, underwent a therapeutic abortion 
performed by the defendant, Associates in Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, through its doctor, Mary Jane Grey.113  During 
the operation, the plaintiff’s uterus was perforated, requiring 
plaintiff to undergo an emergency hysterectomy.114  The 
plaintiff filed suit, and a key issue at trial was the legal effect 
of Dr. Grey’s statement during cross-examination that she 
“made a mistake, she was sorry, and it [the perforation of the 
uterus] had never happened before.”115  At the close of the 
plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant successfully argued a 
motion for a directed verdict, based on the failure of the 
plaintiff to introduce expert testimony regarding an alleged 
deviation from the proper standard of care on the defendant’s 
part.116  The plaintiff appealed, arguing that Dr. Grey’s 
apology and admission of a personal mistake was sufficient 
for the jury to determine that the doctor had deviated from 
the governing standard of care.117  The Supreme Court of 
Vermont disagreed by holding that Dr. Grey’s apology: 
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Does not establish a departure from the 
standard of care ordinarily exercised by a 
reasonably skillful gynecologist.  The fact the 
physician may have believed, and, if so, 
verbalized the belief that her performance was 
not in accordance with her own personal 
standards of care and skill, is not sufficient in 
the absence of expert medical evidence 
showing a departure from the standards of care 
and skill ordinarily exercised by physicians in 
similar cases.118 
 
 An intriguing rule of law was generated by Senesac.119  
The Supreme Court of Vermont determined that a doctor’s 
apology was not sufficient on its own to hold a doctor liable 
for medical malpractice.120  Dr. Grey admitted she made a 
mistake, and that in her experience of performing abortions, 
uteruses were not normally perforated.121  In other words, Dr. 
Grey’s words only established that she deviated from her 
personal standard of care, that she made a mistake she did not 
normally make.122  To prevail, the plaintiff needed expert 
testimony showing that Dr. Grey’s mistake in this particular 
case showed conduct that fell below the overall standard of 
care that she, as a member of a greater medical community, 
was required to follow.123  It was not enough to show that Dr. 
Grey made a mistake that she did not normally make.124  The 
plaintiff needed to show, through expert testimony, that Dr. 
Grey made a mistake that most reasonably skilled 
gynecologists did not make.125   
                                                 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
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 According to Rehm and Beatty, the result of Senesac was 
that a doctor’s apology became a legal nullity in terms of 
evidentiary value.126  In an analysis of Senesac, they argued: 
 
This case appears to say that plaintiffs, 
supposedly armed with an apology, must 
prove their cases just as if the apology did not 
exist.  A mere apology does not prove any of 
the elements of the case because evidence 
about particular medical facts or events is still 
missing from the plaintiff's case. Since a mere 
apology pertains to a doctor's self-image and 
feelings, it is not evidence of any particular 
medical fact or event.  This leaves the plaintiff 
legally in the same position as one who did not 
receive an apology.127 
 
 Courts across the country should be encouraged to follow 
the Senesac example.  Medical malpractice liability should 
only be imposed when a plaintiff provides sufficient evidence 
of deviation from the requisite standard of care.128  A doctor’s 
apology, at most, is an expression of the doctor’s remorse at 
an undesirable result or his personal opinion that his conduct 
amounted to a mistake.129  An apology may be relevant to the 
question of whether the standard of care was deviated from, 
but should not be the sole decisive factor.130  The appropriate 
inquiry is not whether the individual doctor believes he has 
committed a wrong, but whether, in light of the standard of 
care that he is required to comport his conduct to, his action 
was unreasonable.131  If the plaintiff is unable to procure such 
evidence, typically in the form of expert testimony, then a 
mere doctor’s apology should not be allowed to become a 
legal “trump card” of sorts, allowing the plaintiff to abandon 
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the deviation of care standard and simply rest his case on a 
doctor’s expression of sympathy.132  To allow this would be 
to punish the doctor who gives an honest opinion of how a 
medical mistake was made.133 
 Senesac was expanded upon by the Supreme Court of 
Vermont in Phinney v. Vinson.134  In this case, plaintiff 
Robert Phinney underwent a transurethral resection of the 
prostate, performed by the defendant, Dr. Robert Vinson.135  
Significant pain following the procedure caused the plaintiff 
to see another doctor, who determined that the operation was 
“inadequate.”136  Dr. Vinson told the plaintiff that he had 
been informed by the second doctor “that he had performed 
an ‘inadequate resection’ and he apologized . . . ‘for his 
failure to do so’.”137 
 Like the plaintiff in Senesac, Phinney attempted to base 
his case solely on Dr. Vinson’s apology as evidence that the 
doctor fell below the requisite standard of care.138  Again, the 
court ruled that a personal apology is not enough to prove 
that the doctor failed to meet the requisite standard of care, 
and that further evidence, typically in the form of expert 
testimony, would be needed.139   
 Cases such as Senesac and Phinney recognize that the 
practice of medicine, despite modern advances, is not an 
exact science.140  It is possible, and even reasonable, for 
certain mistakes to be made.  Without the benefit of medical 
training, the jury must be given evidence from an expert that 
explains what the defendant doctor did, why the doctor’s 
action fell below the appropriate standard of care, and why 
                                                 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  605 A.2d 849 (Vt. 1992); (see Senesac, 605 A.2d 900). 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 850. 
140  See Senesac v. Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 449 A.2d 
900 (Vt. 1982); Phiney, 605 A.2d 849.  
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the doctor’s action was not simply an uncommon, non-
negligent mistake.  Rehm and Beatty argue: 
 
The lesson Phinney teaches is how difficult it 
is for a plaintiff to win based on an apology 
alone.  It appears safe for a practitioner to 
apologize for an inadequate outcome or result, 
as long as there is no admission that the 
inadequate outcome was caused by the 
practioner's [sic] negligence.  It appears that 
there is an understanding that the result of an 
operation is not guaranteed, not every 
operation will be successful, and an apology 
for the inadequacy of an operation does not 
mean the doctor is liable for negligence.  This 
is a practical precedent in that it allows a 
doctor to express sympathy or empathy, 
without fear of reprisal, when the result of a 
procedure is not as good as was hoped for.  
Such expressions usually help heal the feelings 
and relationships of all persons involved.141  
  
Courts across the country are well-advised to continue 
with the Senesac-Phinney line of reasoning when it comes to 
medical malpractice cases.  As these cases illustrate, a doctor 
may apologize to a patient for any number of reasons, 
ranging from personal sympathy to regret stemming from a 
belief that a mistake has been made.  While perfection is 
often hoped for from a doctor’s work, the practice of 
medicine is never completely devoid of error.  The mere 
recognition by the doctor that he made a mistake should not 
be enough to hold a doctor liable in a medical malpractice 
action.  The key inquiry, to come typically from expert 
testimony, is whether the mistake made is one that is not 
unusual within the medical field and thus excusable, or if it is 
one that shows a failure on the doctor’s part to perform in 
accordance with the requisite standard of care. 
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iii. EXPANDING ON SENESAC: WHEN AN 
APOLOGY PROVIDES MORE THAN A SIMPLE 
“I’M SORRY” 
 
 What if a doctor makes a statement that provides, in 
addition to an expression of sorrow, clearer evidence of a 
deviation from the standard of care?  The Supreme Court of 
Michigan was faced with such a case.142  Unlike the simple 
apology made by Dr. Grey in Senesac, the defendant in 
Pachtman, Dr. Judith Pachtman, made statements to a 
patient’s family member that she knew she had used a needle 
that was “too small.”143  The needle broke inside the patient’s 
muscle tissue, causing doctors to search for it for twenty 
minutes.144  The majority of the court determined that this 
statement on its own was insufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of medical malpractice.145 
 The Pachtman dissent, written by Justice Charles Levin, 
provides a better compromise.146  Justice Levin pointed to 
Senesac as an example of a case where the doctor’s statement 
did not “explain with relative precision what the physician 
should have done.”147  Justice Levin added that an Idaho case 
provided another example of a doctor’s expression of error 
that did not provide sufficient evidence to impose legal 
liability.148  Justice Levin argued that in Maxwell, the Idaho 
Supreme Court correctly determined that malpractice liability 
cannot be imposed upon a doctor for his simple statement that 
he “obviously messed up.”149  Justice Levin pointed to a third 
case out of California, where a doctor’s statement that he 
                                                 
142  Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 1994). 
143  Id. at 789 (compare Senesac, 449 A.2d at 903). 
144  Id. at 788. 
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“blamed himself” for the patient being in the hospital was 
insufficient to show deviation from the standard of care.150 
 Justice Levin agreed that simple statements of sorrow are 
not enough to show deviation from the standard of care, but 
the statement of the physician in Pachtman was more 
complex.151  In admitting that she “knew” the needle she was 
using was “too small,” in Levin’s opinion, Dr. Pachtman 
provided evidence that there was a standard practice of 
needle usage in the medical community, the doctor was aware 
of this practice, yet knowingly went against it.152   
 Indeed, simple apologies should not be allowed as 
evidence of a deviation from the standard of care.  Highly 
non-technical expressions such as “I messed up” or “I blame 
myself” should not be the sole basis on which liability for 
medical malpractice is imposed.  However, Justice Levin 
makes a strong argument that statements that go beyond 
simple apologies and provide evidence of unreasonable error 
should be admissible.153  Dr. Pachtman’s words indicated that 
in her field of medicine, there was a properly sized needle to 
use for that particular procedure, and that she knew she did 
not have the proper size, but she went forward using the 
improper needle anyway.154  Dr. Pachtman effectively 
became an expert against herself as her words established a 
standard of care in regard to needle usage and a 
corresponding failure to adhere to it.155 
 The Supreme Court of Michigan disagreed with the 
dissent, and in doing so, effectively decided it would be 
unfair to punish Dr. Pachtman for vocalizing her mistakes by 
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making her words the main basis for establishing liability.156  
Justice Levin made a valid argument in that, while simple 
apologies should be protected, more complex statements 
involving clear evidence should be admissible.157  Given the 
impact of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and its 
state counterparts, doctors should be forewarned that in 
speaking outside of settlement negotiations, the more detailed 
an apology is, the more evidence it provides.158   
 
B. LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: ENCOURAGING 
LAWMAKERS TO PROTECT APOLOGIES FROM 
ADMISSIBILITY 
 
The Senesac case achieved much in the way of preventing 
apologies from becoming admissible evidence.159  Yet, even 
in following the Senesac line of reasoning, courts cannot 
completely wipe out apologies at trial.160  As seen in the 
Pachtman dissent, there is a dispute among legal minds when 
it comes to the treatment of detailed versus simple 
apologies.161  Moreover, Senesac does not keep an apology 
out altogether.162  Senesac merely limits the apology from 
becoming the sole evidence for finding liability against a 
physician defendant.163 
Courts can only do so much, as the task of clarifying the 
evidentiary value to be attached to doctor’s apologies is the 
                                                 
156  Id. at 792–93. 
157  Id. at 794–97. 
158  Fed. R. Evid. 408 (Rule 408 prevents statements made during 
settlement negotiations from becoming admissible evidence.  
Accordingly, when this is done outside of settlement negotiations, doctors 
apologize at their own peril.  The more details doctors offer concerning 
their error, the greater the risk that those same details could be used 
against them as evidence). 
159  See supra text accompanying note 90. 
160  Senesac v. Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900 
(Vt. 1982). 
161  Locke, 521 N.W.2d at 794–97.  
162  Senesac, 449 A.2d at 903. 
163  Id. (see also supra text accompanying note 90). 
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duty for state and federal legislators.  Several states have 
created laws that protect apologies from being admissible 
against the doctor/apologizer at trial.164   
Generally, there are two types of apology protection 
laws.165 Both typically protect apologies from being used as 
evidence against the apologizing doctor.166  The main 
difference between them is whether the doctor is legally 
mandated to disclose details regarding medical errors.167 
 
i. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE LAWS 
  
Approximately five states have “mandatory disclosure” 
laws, meaning that the hospital has no choice when it comes 
to disclosing medical errors.168  Nevada’s mandatory 
disclosure law for hospitals is one example.169  Under the 
Nevada law, medical errors are referred to as “sentinel 
events” and each hospital must designate a representative 
who is required to notify a patient of the details behind a 
sentinel event within seven days of its occurrence.170  This 
notification, being a legal duty, is not an acknowledgement or 
admission of liability under the Nevada law.171 
 Pennsylvania’s mandatory disclosure law provides more 
detail than the Nevada law.172  The Pennsylvania law requires 
all health care workers, when they reasonably believe a 
“serious incident” has occurred, to report that incident 
according to the hospital’s safety plan.173  The hospital then 
                                                 
164  The Sorry Works! Coalition, States with Apology Laws, 
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has a duty to report the event to the patient.174  The law 
extends “whistleblower” protection to the health care worker 
by preventing the hospital from taking retaliatory actions 
against the health care worker for reporting the event.175 
 The problem with the Nevada and Pennsylvania laws is 
that they state the legal duties of hospitals in terms that are 
general and open to interpretation.  For example, under the 
Nevada law, hospitals must report on “sentinel events,” but 
the law does not state what exactly the hospital representative 
must tell the patient about the event.176  Pennsylvania leaves 
it up to the health care worker to designate what to disclose 
and arguably, a great deal of interpretation comes in to play if 
the standard is determined by what the health care worker 
believes to be “serious.”177 
 If states are going to impose a burden of mandatory 
reporting, then hospitals should be given clear instructions on 
what they are to report.  New Jersey provides a 
comprehensive statute, complete with definitions of key 
terms.178  This statute defines an “adverse event” as “a 
negative consequence of care that results in unintended injury 
or illness, which may or may not have been preventable.”179  
New Jersey hospital workers thus have a clearer standard on 
which to guide them.180  Interestingly, while the law’s 
definition of adverse events incorporates preventable events, 
the law also states that health care facilities must report 
“preventable adverse events.”181  Specifically, facilities must 
report these events to patients and to the State Department of 
Human Services.182  Health care workers are encouraged to 
report adverse events not covered by the law to the 
department and are protected from retaliatory action for doing 
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so.183  The law goes on to provide a complex explanation of 
when documents and other information created during the 
mandatory reporting process can and cannot be used as 
evidence.184 
 
ii.  NON-MANDATORY APOLOGY PROTECTION 
LAWS 
 
Roughly twenty-nine states have apology laws that 
protect expressions of sympathy or sorrow from being used 
as evidence against the apologizer.185  States vary in whether 
protection is given to those involved solely with medical 
errors or to other non-medical incidents.  Massachusetts was 
the first state in the nation to provide an apology protection 
law.  The Massachusetts apology protection statute, which 
applies to all accidents and not simply those of a medical 
nature, reads: 
 
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures 
expressing sympathy or a general sense of 
benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or 
death of a person involved in an accident and 
made to such person or to the family of such 
person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an 
admission of liability in a civil action.186 
 
 The statute is relatively short, but it says a great deal.  It 
allows a person who has caused an accident to apologize 
without fear of that apology being used as evidence against 
him.187  This law denies admissibility to an apology whether 
the apologizer was indeed at fault or even if he merely gave 
an apology based on human emotions that arise from being 
involved in a disturbing accident.188  Laws such as the one in 
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Massachusetts do not prevent an accident victim from 
suing.189  Instead, they ensure that the victim will prove his 
case through actual evidence of the defendant’s wrongdoing, 
and not based simply on an apology.190 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: AN OVERALL NEED FOR 
APOLOGIES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 
 
 Apologizing to a patient harmed by a medical error is the 
moral thing for a doctor to do.  Yet, there is an overwhelming 
fear among doctors that while saying “I’m sorry” is the right 
thing to do, an apology could turn costly as well.  From 
reviewing the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the research of 
Robbenolt and the Sorry Works Coalition, it is shown that 
doctors need not fear apologizing during settlement 
negotiations, and doing so leads to a stronger likelihood that a 
patient will accept a proposed settlement rather than seek a 
costly trial.  As for situations where apologies are admissible, 
courts and lawmakers across the country can learn from the 
strides made by their counterparts in other states. 
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